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States can require attorneys for mentally ill defendants
Published: June 30, 2008
States are not constitutionally forbidden from insisting on legal representation for parties who are competent to stand trial but not mentally competent to conduct their own defense, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled.
The defendant faced criminal charges following an incident in which he attempted to steal a pair of shoes from a department store. When he was discovered with the stolen shoes, the defendant withdrew a gun, fired and wounded a bystander.
His mental condition became the subject of three competency proceedings and two requests to represent himself. After the defendant's second request was denied, the court appointed counsel for him and a jury convicted him on two counts.
He appealed, claiming that the trial court's refusal to allow him to represent himself at trial deprived him of his constitutional right to self-representation.
But the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, affirming the trial court.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen Breyer said that the nature of mental illness "cautions against the use of a single mental competency standard for deciding both (1) whether a defendant who is represented by counsel can proceed to trial and (2) whether a defendant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself. Mental illness itself is not a unitary concept. It varies in degree. It can vary over time. It interferes with an individual's functioning at different times in different ways."
Further, the Court said, "a right of self-representation at trial will not 'affirm the dignity' of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel. … To the contrary, given that defendant's uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well result from his self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling. Moreover, insofar as a defendant's lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context undercuts the most basic of the Constitution's criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial. …
"We consequently conclude that the Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant's mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so."
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.
U.S. Supreme Court. Indiana v. Edwards, No. 07-208. June 19, 2008. Lawyers USA No. 99310153. Click here for the full text of this opinion.
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